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In recent decades, decentralisation measures have been implemented in most advanced 
democracies. While such reforms may be driven by subnational pressures and demands 
for empowerment, the central government usually has the deciding power to decentralise. 
Literature on regional preference has proliferated since the 1990s, though we know little 
of regional administrative preferences in relation to this process. As policy formulators 
and implementers, they are directly affected by dispersion of authority downwards, as it 
directly affects their organisational structures and portfolio of responsibilities. This article 
analyses decentralisation preferences among regional bureaucrats in Norway in the 
context of the 2015-2020 Regional Government Reform. Utilising an original survey and 
testing five explanations, the bureaucrats are generally reserved about taking on 
additional functions, with support for increasing their portfolio primarily explained by a 
principled motivation to increase regional autonomy, followed by feelings of regional 
attachment. Functional arguments also matter, though to a lesser extent. The bureaucrats’ 
principled, rather than functional, attitude towards regionalisation deviates from 
theoretical premises of decentralisation literature, while also challenging more underlying 
notions of bureaucratic thinking, inviting further research into how these dynamics 
manifest themselves among members of the civil service. 
 
Introduction 
In most states today, competences – for instances a specific welfare service – are 
located at the government level where they are deemed best suited and most 
effective when provided to the citizens. A trend of regionalisation has been 
documented among most advanced democracies in the decades since 1950, with 
particular waves of reform in the 1970s and 1990s (Hooghe, Marks, & Schakel, 
2010). Further regional empowerment has continued since then, accompanied by 
increased scholarly attention to the regional level. A common feature of this 
process has been the dispersion of competences downwards from the national 
level (and in some cases upwards from the local level). Such a reallocation of 
competences affects the administrative capacities of the government levels 
affected, through for instance, the reorganisation of budgetary and human 
resources. As their jobs consist of implementing and administrating policies, 
political decisions and various forms of services, reforming their managerial 
portfolio makes regional administrations direct stakeholders in regionalisation 
reforms.  
Upwards communication in the administrative chain of command, and the 
administrative- political contact at the upper echelons of a bureaucracy, is a 
(though not the only one) source of influence for policy formulation. In this 
regard, bureaucrats play important roles regarding not only policy     
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implementation, but also its design, making it relevant and important to 
understand their reform motivations and preferences (Egeberg & Stigen, 2018). 
Bureaucrats’ preference for certain kinds of tasks may have implications for how 
they respond to institutional reform. This is especially so when the design of the 
bureaucracy is altered, providing opportunities to shape their working 
environments (Gains & John, 2010, p. 456). Moreover, administrative resistance 
against structural reform can make implementation more difficult, and their post-
reform working environments more uncertain (and vice versa). With reforms set 
to take place, do bureaucrats actually desire a broader portfolio of 
responsibilities, or do they prefer to preserve the status quo? And what factors 
explain such preferences?  
With a documented trend of regional empowerment, particularly relating to 
institutional developments in the EU since the 1990s (Marks, 1993), scholars 
have sought to explain preferences of regional actors for a range of topics, and 
also developed models to explain these preferences. This literature has usually 
addressed topics related either to externalities, for instance regional preferences 
regarding the institutional arrangement of the supranational level (Tatham & 
Bauer, 2014b) or identifying drivers of preferences regarding norms of 
governance, such as what ought to be the government’s role in the economy 
(Tatham & Bauer, 2015). It has to a lesser extent addressed preferences 
regarding regional institutions themselves, such as the role and scope of regional 
government, or attitudes towards regional institutional change.  
This article seeks to address that. Utilising decentralisation theory and public 
administration literature, it explores Norwegian regional bureaucrats’ 
preferences for the regionalisation of competences, plugging both a substantive 
and geographical gap by adding a Nordic setting to the literature, which thus far 
has been largely neglected.  
In 2020, the Norwegian Regional Government Reform amalgamated 15 of 
19 counties, forming 11 new regions, as well as transferring some new 
competences and administrative functions to the regional level. Initiated and 
implemented by the central government, and not explicitly driven by regional 
demands, this reform provides an opportunity to study decentralisation 
preferences among regional administrators outside an otherwise common setting 
in which such reforms are desired or demanded at the subnational level. While 
the attitudes of citizens and politicians towards the reform have been 
documented in both academic and non-academic literature, less is known about 
the regional bureaucrats, whose jobs, tasks, and positions were directly affected 
by the reform’s outcome.1  
Utilising original survey data collected from Norwegian regional bureaucrats 
during the reform process, this article explores factors that affect their desire to 
increase the regional portfolio of responsibilities and competences in nine policy 
areas.  
Overall, the regional bureaucrats do not display a great desire for large-scale 
regionalisation of competences, indicating instead a preference for (pre-reform) 
status-quo arrangements. Where a desire for regionalisation is observed, it is 
primarily driven by a principled rather than functional dynamics. Bureaucrats 




desiring increased levels of autonomy, and those highly attached to their 
counties are largely positive towards widening the regional portfolio. This is also 
true, though to a lesser extent, for administrative elites. The bureaucrats’ 
seniority does not matter much, and when it does, its effect is more ambivalent, 
representing the only case where they want fewer functions located at the 
regional level. While improving regional public service quality is considered 
highly desirable, it does not affect their regionalisation preferences. It is also 
unaffected by their attitudes towards increased regional autonomy, indicating an 
overall picture of bureaucrats driven more by principles of governance and 
logics of identity rather than arguments pertaining to functional effects. The 
relative importance of these two dynamics is somewhat surprising, challenging 
theoretical arguments for decentralisation as well as general notions of 
bureaucratic thinking.  
The article is structured as follows: The next section briefly summarises the 
2015-2020 Norwegian Regional Government Reform. Following this, the third 
section outlines theoretical expectations and hypotheses, before defining data 
collection and research designs in the fourth section. Results are then presented, 
followed by discussions of central findings, with concluding remarks. The article 
thus contributes to our empirical knowledge of administrative preferences, 
shedding light on the determinants of support towards downwards dispersion of 
competences.  
 
The Norwegian Regional Reform  
Since the mid-20th century, the territorial structure and competence portfolio of 
the Norwegian counties have been subject to debate, reforms and attempts at 
reforms. Although periodically, various central government-appointed 
commissions have stressed a need to reform, the outcome has usually been minor 
administrative responsibility transfers to or from the regional level.2 
In 2013, the newly elected minority coalition government consisting of the 
Conservative and Progress parties initiated a municipal amalgamation reform, 
relying on the Liberal and Christian Democratic parties to secure a parliamentary 
majority. By creating larger municipal units, the government parties claimed the 
regional tier to be superfluous, preferring to abolish the county governments and 
transfer their functions to the local level. A parliamentary majority for the 
abolition of the regional level has historically been non-existent, however. 
Moreover, wanting to decentralise functions from the central level to the 
counties, the Liberal and Christian Democratic parties desired a similar reform 
of the regional level in exchange for backing the government's municipal reform.  
The government agreed, and in 2015, the Minister of Local Government and 
Modernisation engaged the counties' elected officials to commence processes to 
determine their decentralisation and amalgamation preferences. Many counties 
held the former as conditional for accepting the latter. The counties' competence 
preferences ranged from broad and general policy areas to individual and 
specific administrative tasks and responsibilities, while also stressing the 







Since the 1970s, administrative reforms have reallocated competences both 
to and from the regional level – the most significant of which was the 
centralisation of hospital ownership and specialist healthcare services in 2002, 
which had until then grown to become the largest area of responsibility for the 
counties.3 Prior to the regional reform, the Norwegian counties' competences 
consisted of:  
 
1. Secondary schools, including adult training and vocational education. 
This being the most significant policy area, amounting to roughly 47% 
of the county's expenses,  
2. Public transport systems and county roads; following secondary 
education in significance, amounting to roughly 21% and 12% of the 
county's expenses, respectively,  
3. Dental services,  
4. Culture, including the management of lottery funds for sports facilities 
and cultural buildings as well as cultural heritage protection,  
5. Environmental and water management authority, including allocation of 
fish farming licenses,  
6. Regional research funds and innovation, and (7) Business and 
commerce related activities.  
 
In addition to these, cross-sector and cross-level cooperation regarding the 
overall development and planning of the regional level also takes place.4  
After the counties had expressed their decentralisation preferences, a 
government-appointed committee proposed a range of tasks to be transferred, 
which was summarised into five broad areas:  
 
1. Commerce, Competence and Integration, 
2. Culture and Cultural Heritage Protection 
3. Climate, Environment and Natural Resources,  
4. Health and Living, and 
5. Roads and Transport.  
 
After concluding hearings on the committee's report, the government issued 
a white paper laying out a list of functions they would transfer, which partly 
reflected those suggested by the committee. It also stipulated that further 
competences would be subject to review for decentralisation in the future. The 
government transferred functions within: 
  
1. Business and Business-oriented Research,  
2. Agriculture,  
3. Roads, Transport and Related Infrastructure,  
4. Competence and Integration,  
5. Public Health,  
6. Northern Norway (involving matters relating to the arctic area, and as 
such only applicable to the northern counties), and  
7. Climate and Environment.  




Competences subject to consideration in the future included: 
1. Business and Business-oriented Research,  
2. Competence and Integration, 
3. Child Protective Services and  
4. Culture 
 
On 1 January 2020, the reform was implemented, amalgamating counties as 
well as transferring the competences. It is interesting to note that the reform was 
largely desired, initiated, designed, and implemented at the central level, without 
being grounded in regional desires. In fact, it was widely resisted at the regional 
level, largely due to the amalgamations, several of which happened against the 
counties’ will. This created a context in which we may examine preferences 
towards regionalisation processes when they are not the result of subnational 
pressures, which has often been an important motivator and cause for regional 
reform elsewhere.  
 
Theoretical Framework  
Since the 1990s, theoretical and empirical literature relating to preferences of 
regional actors has proliferated. Consequently, scholars have developed models 
that capture the driving forces and logics behind the trend of the empowerment 
of regions (Bauer, 2006; Bauer, Pitschel, & Studinger, 2010; Gains & John, 
2010; Studinger & Bauer, 2012; Tatham & Bauer, 2014a; 2014b).  
This literature commonly views regionalisation as a consequence of 
subnational and supranational institutional developments, by for instance 
observing regional demands for control over power dispersion, or demands for 
having a greater say on supranational integration measures (Tatham & Bauer, 
2014a; 2014b). However, the actual power to disperse authority away from the 
national level often rests with the national governments themselves (Tatham & 
Bauer, 2016).  
Moreover, the Nordic regionalism debate draws on many similar arguments 
as those in other European countries, which were influenced by a growing 
institutionalisation of regional cooperation and integration since the 1990s. 
Among its core characteristics is an increased focus on the regional level as an 
arena for political decision-making (Baldersheim & Ståhlberg, 1999). To gauge 
the drivers of Norwegian regional bureaucrats’ decentralisation preferences, 
therefore, a set of hypotheses are formed based on logics that have explained 
preference variation in other regions. These hypotheses combine decentralisation 
theory and public administration literature, utilising principles and functional 
aspects from both, to form an overarching view of how we should expect 
regional bureaucrats to respond to decentralisation measures.  
 
Five Expectations  
Descriptively, regional administrative preference literature has usually observed 
support for the status-quo, and no great desires to upend existing institutional 
arrangements and structures of governance. This is also found among Norwegian 







To assess the preferences among regional bureaucrats, the following section 
proposes five central explanatories. These have to do with theoretical and 
political motivations for decentralisation, the bureaucrats’ positions within the 
administrations, and their feelings of regional territorial attachment.  
 
Motivations to Decentralise  
The underlying theoretical reasoning for undertaking subnational territorial and 
administrative reforms is usually focused on increasing both the subnational 
government’s independent decision-making capacity, as well as improving its 
output (public service) quality. As functions are decentralised, it increases the 
autonomy of the subnational level, while public services become more tailored 
and suited to the needs of the citizens at the local levels. These logics largely 
find their origins in the works of Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972) (Alibegović & 
Slijepčević, 2016, p. 54). More recently, scholars have operationalised the 
concept of such regional authority by constructing the Regional Authority Index 
(Hooghe, Marks, & Schakel, 2010), in which the region’s self-rule consists not 
only of its competence portfolio, but more generally the regional government’s 
capacities to exercise its authority independently of central government.  
The desire to increase subnational autonomy has been an important driving 
force behind regional reforms across democratic regimes, as the notion of 
subnational autonomy has become a “panacea” – a popular principle of 
governance and a normatively justified policy with little room for criticism – 
since the 1970s (Saito, 2008).  
This relates to the second rationale motivating decentralisation. As they 
become subject to political and administrative management closer to the citizens, 
public services are improved: a rationale drawing on the notion that in order to 
be as efficient and effective as possible, services should be delivered at the 
lowest level possible, so that they become better tailored to the needs of the 
citizens, who are more homogenous in their needs and interests at disaggregated 
levels (Saito, 2008; Tiebout, 1956).  
Both of these motivations were expressed by the reform’s political 
supporters.5 If we then put these arguments to regional bureaucrats as 
motivations to reform the regional level, how do they respond? Following 
general notions of bureaucratic pragmatic thinking (Aberbach, Putnam, & 
Rockman, 1981) and in keeping with the theoretical logics outlined above, we 
should expect that those who consider it important to increase regional autonomy 
– that is, the region’s capacities for independent governance – and to improve 
regional public services, also support decentralisation measures.  
 
H1.a: The more important regional bureaucrats consider increasing regional 
self-rule to be, the greater their desire to allocate competences to the regional 
level.  
 
H1.b: The more important regional bureaucrats consider improving public 
services to be, the greater their desire to allocate competences to the regional 
level.  
 




Professional Motivations  
A central aspect of preference formation theory in the public administration 
literature relates to the professional motivations and self-interests of the 
individual bureaucrat. 
These form important determinants regarding the preferences they have 
and/or decisions they make, be it on the role of government in the economy 
(Tatham & Bauer, 2015), the prospects of job security (Bauer, Pitschel, & 
Studinger, 2010), preferences when the design of their institution is altered 
(Gains & John, 2010) or decision-making behaviour generally (Egeberg & 
Stigen, 2018).  
In other words, a bureaucrat's position is often held as a dominant and 
controlling factor for explaining their attitudes and behaviour (Yoo & Wright, 
1994). These propositions may effectively be summarised in what has become 
known as "Miles' Law": where you stand depends on where you sit (Miles, 
1978), and, when introducing this logic to decentralisation reform, effectively 
incorporates elements of the public choice literature and the budget- maximising 
premise of bureaucracies (Niskanen, 1971). While this premise has been 
challenged, and that senior and high-ranked bureaucrats instead may prefer 
smaller, elite bureaus rather than heading “heavily staffed, large budget but 
routine, conflictual and low status agencies” (Dunleavy, 1991, p. 202), empirical 
observations testing these assumptions among civil servants at the subnational 
level have found that such preferences depend on the type of task they want to 
undertake within the job they have (Gains & John, 2010). Moreover, the jury is 
still out on the explanatory power of these conflicting premises regarding 
subnational bureaucrats facing competence decentralisation.  
The Regional Government Reform involved significant restructuring of the 
regional administrations, both in terms of their geographical location and 
organisational structure. Amalgamating administrative organisations and taking 
on a wider array of responsibilities creates a new “habitus” for the bureaus 
affected, in which individuals will seek to position themselves according to the 
values characterising the social and formal hierarchies within the new and 
enlarged bureaus.6 
In this sense, the impact of structural reforms on the individual bureaucrat 
depends on their ability to navigate and position themselves within the 
administration, which in turn depends on the position they hold prior to the 
reform.  
These logics also lean on the arguments that higher-ranked civil servants (1) 
have more frequent contact with the political sphere of government, and that (2) 
their 'overarching view' of the administration is more ́holistic ́ than that of the 
street-level bureaucrat's, thereby being able to see opportunities for altering or 
widening their institutions’ managerial portfolio. 
These logics may also apply to those without a formally higher rank then 
their colleagues, but with extensive experience in the administration. Based on 
these assumptions, the second set of explanatories tests the professional 







their rank, assuming a relationship with decentralisation preferences in line with 
the budget-maximising model’s premises.  
 
H2.a: The higher the bureaucrat’s seniority, the greater the desire to allocate 
competences to the regional level.  
 
H2.b: The higher the bureaucrat’s rank, the greater the desire to allocate 
competences to the regional level.  
 
Theoretically, we should expect some level of correlation between these two 
factors, as higher- ranked members of the administration may also have greater 
seniority than their lower-ranked colleagues. To address this, issues of 
multicollinearity are empirically tested for in the data section.  
 
Attachment  
The last explanatory relates to the territorial dimension of regionalisation. Long-
established territorially-based communities may create common feelings of 
identity or belonging, which may materialise as feelings of attachment, produced 
and reproduced through discourses relating to the territories and communities in 
question (Terlouw, 2016). This may produce demands for empowerment, 
cultivating a 'rise of regions' (Tatham & Mbaye, 2018).  
This community logic, and its effect on increasing regional authority, may 
arise “because individuals prefer to choose rules who share their 
cultural/linguistic/political norms (...) where regional community is strong, one 
should find more regional authority” (Hooghe, Marks, & Schakel, 2010, p. 65). 
The territorial dimension of subnational empowerment has been documented as 
an important determinant in regionalisation literature, including regional elite 
preferences for competence allocation in the EU system (Tatham & Bauer, 
2016).  
As regional government employees, the regional bureaucrats are also 
members of the territorial communities in which they administrate, implement 
and provide services. Assuming a territorial attachment is present among the 
bureaucrats, this should be further strengthened by the fact that their daily work 
consists of managing and providing services on behalf of the regional level.  
If one is strongly attached to one's territorial jurisdiction, one desires to 
strengthen the relative importance of that territory, in this case, through 
allocating more functions to it at the cost of the central level. Hence, bureaucrats 
strongly attached to the territory in which they administrate and implement 
policy, can be expected to want to increase the regional level’s authority through 
a broadening of its managerial portfolio.   
 
H3 – The stronger the feeling of attachment the bureaucrat has to their county, 
the greater the desire to allocate competences to it.  
 
Data and Research Design  
Original survey data collected between November 2017 and January 2018 
captured a range of observables related to the bureaucrats' reform preferences. 




Through the web-based tool SurveyXact, a total of 3628 county government 
employees in each county, excluding the capital Oslo, received a survey 
consisting of 41 questions by email.7 Of the recipients, 1239 responded in full, 
yielding a total response rate of 34%. Permission for the data collection was 
granted by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data’s Data Protection Services, 
while the administrative leaders in each county were also made aware of the 
survey in advance. Those who had not responded after the initial distribution 
received two reminders at 2-week intervals. As a statistical dataset of reform 
preferences from all of Norway's county administrations, it is the first of its kind 
(Myksvoll, 2018).  
To measure their decentralisation preferences, the respondents were given 
nine points to freely distribute between the local, regional and national 
government levels in nine policy areas (nine points to distribute in agriculture, 
nine points to distribute in climate and environment, and so on; a total of 81 
points).8 The policy areas were chosen based on their prevalence in the reform as 
possible areas where regionalisation could take place.9 They were informed that 
the more points they allocated to a single level, the more it would entail costs 
and financing but also rights and responsibilities within that specific policy area. 
Table 1 summarises the respondent’s point distribution to the regional level, and 
for contextual purposes also includes the number of county councils that desired 
competences within, or broader aspects of, each individual policy area when they 
made their preferences to the government.  
 
Table 1. Summary of dependent variables  
Policy Area Min/Max Mean (SD) Median Desired by (n/17 
counties) 
Agriculture 0/9 3.21 (1.81) 3 12 
Climate and Environment 0/9 3.06 (1.47) 3 17 












Cultural Institutions 0/9 3.57 (1.54) 3 9 
Immigrant Integration 0/9 2.12 (1.37) 2 10 
Regional Planning 0/9 5.9 (1.94) 6 8 
Roads and Transport 0/9 3.82 (1.66) 3 15 
Secondary Education10 0/9 6.62 (2.2) 7 10 
Descriptive summary statistics of regional bureaucrats’ point allocation to the regional level. Nine 
points distributable in each of the policy areas. N = 1239 for all policy areas. 
 
To measure their preferences regarding the importance of increasing regional 
self-rule and improving regional public services, the respondents answered on an 
ordinal scale ranging from 1: "not important" to 5: "very important". The 
position-based variables were captured by the respondents’ seniority in terms of 
years (recoded to decades), while their rank was ordered into three levels: 
consultant/advisor (also known as 'street-level bureaucrat'), middle-management, 
and management. A 10-point scale measured the respondents' feelings of 







Table 2. Summary of central explanatory variables  
Explanatory 
Factor 
Variable Description Min/ 
Max 







How important is increasing 







How important is improving 












How many years have you 














1.31 (0.61) + 
 
Identity To what degree do you feel 







 N = 1239. Control variables reported in supplementary appendix. 
 
To account for other possible causes of regionalisation preference variation, 
controls at both individual and regional levels are included.  
At the individual level, the control variables draw on socialisation literature 
commonly employed in explanatory models in preference formation literature 
(Yoo & Wright, 1994; Tatham & Bauer, 2015; Egeberg & Stigen, 2018). These 
include the bureaucrat's characteristics and background (gender, age, ideological 
self-placement, educational level and pathways), as well as other career 
observables (previous experience in the public and private sectors, and the 
department in which they were employed at the time of the data collection).  
Lastly, the competence transfers constituted one element of the reform, the 
county amalgamations the other. Thus, the bureaucrats’ preferences towards the 
amalgamations are also controlled for.  
Regional level controls include county level demographic, economic and 
geographic variables. Through the logic of scale economic effects, territorial, 
economic and government size of regions is perceived to affect the efficiency 
and capacity the government has to take on responsibilities and tasks (Studinger 
& Bauer, 2012, p. 16; Tatham & Bauer, 2016, p. 2). In this sense, demographic 
and economic variables are measured by county population and GDP/capita.  
The geographical factor is linked to the reform’s amalgamations. Territorial 
consolidation reforms invariably create new centres and peripheries within the 
territories affected. In other words, county amalgamations establish new regional 
capitals at the expense of old centres, now turned peripheries within the new 
region (Lie, 2006, p. 49; 90). As such, the central explanatory variables are also 
controlled for by assessing the status of each pre-amalgamated county as 
constituting either a regional centre or periphery within the new region.  
While the bureaucrats represent their distinct counties, and thus sharing a 
number of (observed and unobserved) characteristics according to their 
geographical placement, empirically testing the level of regional clustering 
among the bureaucrats in each policy area reveals low levels (mean = .012, max 
= .03 in the empty models) of intraclass correlation. In other words, on average, 













0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
regional clustering only accounts for 1.2% of point allocation variance among 
the respondents. Hence, the bureaucrats' point allocation is analysed in two 
single level linear OLS- regression models: (1) a 'rudimentary' model, where 
only the central variables of interest are included (n = 1239), and (2) a model 
with 30 individual and regional level controls added (n = 1114).  
Given the number of variables, the data was tested for possible issues of 
multicollinearity. The variance inflation factor for the full models returned 
overall (mean = 1.41) and individual (max = 2.73) values in all nine policy areas 
indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem when running the proposed 
models in any of them.  
 
Results  
Figure 1 displays the bureaucrats’ point allocation to the regional level in the 
nine policy areas. Across all areas, the point distribution averages just above 4. 
Clustering their point allocation around the 3-4-point range in most of the policy 
areas, the regional bureaucrats display no great desire to empower the regional 
level in policy areas for which they are not already responsible. This shows as 
Secondary Education and Regional Planning tops the point distribution with 6.6 
and 5.8 points, respectively, forming significant outliers in the point allocation, 
whilst also displaying a more even distribution rather than being heavily 
clustered around a single point.  
 
Figure 1. Regional bureaucrats’ point allocation to the regional level  
Beanplot of regional bureaucrats’ point allocation to the regional level in descending order. Dashed 
line represents overall mean, solid lines represent individual means. Larger “beans” represent higher 
densities. X-axis denotes points allocated by the regional bureaucrats. N = 1239.  
 
It is important to note that these two are policy areas in which the county 
governments already have a relatively high number of responsibilities; as such, 
while they significantly differ from the rest, this is not surprising when 
considering the overall impression that the bureaucrats prefer a (pre-reform) 







The lower point allocation in Roads and Transport, which is the second 
most important area for the counties, could be explained as a manifestation of 
desiring specific tasks within the area, rather than a desire for a “complete 
takeover”. The wider distribution of points on the two most highly desired areas 
may also suggest a difference of opinion between desiring new competences and 
merely retaining what they already have.  
The distribution of points in the various policies reveals varying degrees of 
congruence. Immigrant Integration clusters around 3 points, but a considerable 
number of bureaucrats have allocated fewer points, while very few have gone 
above, making this the policy area least desired by the bureaucrats. In between 
this and the two top outliers, we see that the bureaucrats have largely clustered 
their point distribution around the 3-4-point range, though the allocation skews 
mostly upwards, (Cultural Grants, Roads and Transport, Community 
Development, Cultural Institutions), suggesting that a significant amount of 
bureaucrats are positive to receiving additional tasks in these areas, while two 
(Agriculture and Climate and Environment) are more normally distributed 
around the 3-point cluster.  
Agriculture and Climate and Environment are interesting cases as a number 
of tasks within them are located at the County Governor, a county-level central 
government institution. Hence, a transfer of tasks within these areas is a more 
complicated matter, as they would entail institutional decentralisation, but not, in 
the strictest sense, regionalisation, as they would move from one regional 
authority to another. Whether the bureaucrats’ point allocation reflects this is 
uncertain.  
Overall, figure 1 presents a picture of somewhat reserved regional 
bureaucrats; policy areas already located at the regional level are desired kept (or 
expanded), while other policy areas are looked on with some reservation – 
though not without differences of opinion.  
 
Drivers of competence desires  
Addressing the drivers of their point allocation, the bureaucrats’ preferences are 
primarily driven by the “increasing self-rule” argument. In every policy area, 
those perceiving it important to increase regional autonomy are more positive 
towards regionalising competences. Following this, we see that stronger feelings 
of county attachment increases point allocation in just over half of the policies 
(Secondary Education, Roads and Transport, Community Development, Climate 
and Environment, and Immigrant Integration).  
The higher the bureaucrat’s rank, the more positive they are towards 
increasing regional decision-making responsibilities in over half over the policy 
areas, though this depends on the presence of control variables in certain cases 
(Secondary Education, Regional Planning, Cultural Grants, Roads and 
Transport when controls are introduced, and Agriculture when they are not).  
Just behind in prevalence, the seniority of the bureaucrats affects their point 
allocation in under half of the policies (Secondary Education, Regional Planning 
when controls are omitted, Roads and Transport, and Immigrant Integration). 
This is also the only instance in which we observe a negative effect. The greater 
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the bureaucrats’ seniority, the less they desire regional responsibility of 
immigrant integration measures.  
Finally, although valued highly by the bureaucrats (mean 4,53 / 5), the 
importance of improving public services at the regional level does not 
significantly affect any policy areas, except in the case of Secondary Education.  
 
Figure 2. Effects of central explanatory variables on regional bureaucrats’ 
regionalisation preferences  
OLS-regression of central explanatory variables on bureaucrats’ point allocation in nine policy areas. 
Central explanatories tested in two models: (1) a “Rudimentary” model (N = 1239 in all policy 
areas), containing only the central explanatories and (2) a “Controls” model (N = 1114 in all policy 
areas), which includes all 30 regional and individual level controls. Policy areas ordered in 
descending prevalence (left-right, top-bottom) according to the bureaucrats’ point allocation in figure 
1; regression coefficients on the x-axes; 95% confidence intervals displayed.  
 
Given the number of dependent variables and the central explanatory 
variables’ varying effects, it makes more sense to evaluate the hypotheses in a 
scale-like manner rather than dichotomously rejecting or failing to reject the null 
hypotheses. On one end of this scale, we see that H1.a is confirmed in all cases, 
while at the other end H1.b is mostly rejected, except in the case of Secondary 
Education. In between these extremes, H2.a, H2.b and H3 are rejected (or 
confirmed) to various degrees, depending on the policy. 
  
Principled or Functional Autonomy?  
The bureaucrats’ perceived feelings of the importance to increase regional 
autonomy matters most to their desires to regionalise competences. This 
explanatory shows the most consistent and highest degree of influence on the 
bureaucrats’ allocation of points to the regional rather than the local and national 
levels. However, its direct effects on the dependent variables cannot explain the 
type of correlation we are seeing.  
The theoretical foundation for this explanatory variable is intricately linked 







efficiency in administrating and delivering services (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972; 
Saito, 2008; Hooghe, Marks, & Schakel, 2010). Adding to this the broadly 
accepted view in public administration literature that though they are not 
completely separated from the sphere of policy-making as earlier theory posited 
(Demir & Nyhan, 2008), bureaucrats are, through the necessity of their jobs, 
more pragmatically-than-ideologically thinking (Aberbach, Putnam, & 
Rockman, 1981). Combining decentralisation theory and public administration 
literature leads to an assumption that bureaucrats may support increasing levels 
of regional autonomy not necessarily as a principally valued good in and of 
itself, but rather as a function to achieve government effectiveness.  
In other words, greater regional autonomy could be held as a means to an 
end; the assumption being that with greater autonomy comes greater 
effectiveness and improved services.  
A way of empirically testing this assumption with the available data is 
through a series of two- way interaction regressions. These were run with the 
increased autonomy and improving services variables on the full models. 
Assessing if increased autonomy was seen a means to achieving improved 
service quality, the latter’s effect on the point allocation was observed at the 
different values of the former. In none of the policies did it produce a significant 
change in the effect observed in figure 2, leaving the improved services variable 
non-significant (except in the Secondary Education case). This indicates that the 
bureaucrats are treating the two notions more independently than the underlying 
theory holds, suggesting that the regional bureaucrats view the autonomy 
argument as a determining factor on its own rather than as a function to achieve 
something else. The results of the interaction regression can only indicate, 
however, as there is a lack of overlap between those who strongly desire 
autonomy but do not at all desire to improve services. Controlling for this still 
gives an indication that an interaction between the two is not taking place.  
Where increasing subnational autonomy through decentralisation has 
become a regarded as a normatively justified policy in and of itself (Saito, 2008), 
it may also be motivated through a desire to increase the importance and status 
of the regional territories. Indeed, the regional empowerment that have taken 
place the last few decades has been explained as a result of increased subnational 
pressures, driven in part by identity and community logics (Tatham & Mbaye, 
2018). The observations in figure 2 and the lack of any significant interactions 
between the autonomy and services arguments disentangles the observed effects 
from a functional attitude among the bureaucrats, suggesting instead a principled 
one. This is further strengthened with the second most prevalent finding in the 
discussion: that higher degrees of regional attachment (sometimes) increases 
support for regionalising competences.  
 
A Moderately Identity-Driven Desire  
The identity and community-driven logics that have accounted for 
regionalisation pressures in a range of democratic polities is visible to some 
extent among the bureaucrats as well. Their county attachment does increase 




support for competence regionalisation in several policies, though where there is 
a significant effect, its substantive size is somewhat moderate.  
While the level of county attachment is relatively high among the 
bureaucrats (see table 1), the general level of regional territorial sentiment is 
comparatively weaker in Norway than in other European countries. Although 
calls for a ‘Nordic regionalism’ debate have been made (Baldersheim & 
Ståhlberg, 1999), community attachments in Norway is predominantly found at 
the local rather than the regional level (Baldersheim & Rose, 2010; Flo, 2015). 
This may help to explain the moderate effects we are seeing. Despite this, it 
should not be ignored as an explanatory factor, being the second most prevalent 
driver of the bureaucrats’ regionalisation preferences.  
 
Carefully optimistic elites  
The bureaucrats’ rank in the administrations does in some cases lead to increased 
support for regionalising competences. While the effect is robust independent of 
controls in Regional Planning, Secondary Education and Cultural Grant 
Management, its effect only becomes significant through controlling factors in 
Roads and Transport and is oppositely moderated towards non-significance in 
Agriculture.  
Thought supported by the budget-maximising model’s premises, the 
underlying logic behind administrative elites being positive towards increasing 
regional responsibilities could be explained by somewhat different dynamics:  
 
1. Widening managerial responsibilities leads to a feeling of increased 
status. Administrative elites, overseeing the responsibilities and 
provisions of the services and implementations of policies thus get a 
greater say on the government's functions and have opportunities to 
become, or stay, highly placed in the post- reform bureau’s new 
habitus.  
2. As elites, placed in the higher echelons of the administrative 
institutions, they have more frequent contact with politicians than the 
street-level bureaucrat. They also have a more ‘holistic’ view of their 
departments or institution, and as such could argue through functional 
necessity the need for additional competences. As they may not deem 
every policy area functionally necessary to regionalise, it could explain 
why some of the policy areas are affected and others are not.  
 
To gauge the bureaucrats’ task preferences in a more detailed manner, the 
survey also included an open-ended response option in which they could 
describe tasks and functions they desired at the regional level more explicitly. To 
address whether the effects of rank on point allocation was explained by 
motivations related to increased status or functional necessity, their open 
responses were compared across their ranks.  
The bureaucrats do not display a substantial difference across the three 







mention, and the arguments they make, generally pointing towards functional 
necessity.  
If we then treat their regionalisation justifications as a constant, yet the elites 
appear more positive in certain areas, the explanation may be found elsewhere, 
such as personal self-interest through increased status. The research design limits 
us from fully capturing this rationale, however, as the survey did not include 
questions relating to the bureaucrats’ job motivations (and few would openly 
admit to being motivated by personal status and self-interest). Hence, the 
assumption that this finding is due to self-interests is mostly based on inductive 
inference, while our empirical observations point to a regionalisation 
justification based on functional necessity. Our understanding of the rank-effect 
is then perhaps best explained by returning to the overall picture of the 
bureaucrats’ preferences.  
 
Reserved but Principled (and Sometimes Functional)  
For the bureaucrats to empower the regional level, the perceived importance of 
increasing regional autonomy matters most. 
While the theoretical underpinning for this relation is interlinked with the 
regional governments’ effectiveness, empirically testing this has revealed a more 
principled thinking among the bureaucrats than initially assumed.  
This also relates to the community and identity logics observed in other 
regional preference studies, and the bureaucrats’ attachment to their counties 
indeed plays a role when the bureaucrats distribute their points to the regional 
level, though to a lesser extent.  
Following the principles and identity-based justifications for 
decentralisation, the bureaucrats’ positions also matter somewhat, as higher-
ranked officials are more positive to regionalising competences in certain areas, 
though their seniority rarely affects their preferences, and represents the only 
case in which we observe a negative effect.  
The perceived importance of improving regional public services does not 
matter, neither directly as a cause of regionalisation desires, nor when treated as 
a functional end reached through increased levels of self-rule. This is interesting, 
as it conflicts with some theoretical assumptions of decentralisation and public 
administration theories. As the theoretical linkage between the two arguments 
fails to materialise empirically, the Norwegian regional bureaucrats instead seem 
to view increased autonomy as a desirable outcome in and of itself rather than as 
a function to improve public service qualities at the regional level. This leaves us 
with a picture of regional bureaucrats more driven by principles of governance 
and identity-logics rather than arguments pertaining to functional pressures, 
effects, and pragmaticism, challenging aspects of decentralisation theories and 
notions of bureaucratic thinking.  
 
Conclusions  
Since 1950, the regional level has gradually increased its importance across 
democratic regimes. Subnational demands for regional empowerment have often 
driven this process. This has not been the case in Norway. Leaving out 




subnational community pressures as a force for regionalisation, the underlying 
rationales for undertaking regional reforms are, however, similar to those found 
in other countries. As direct stakeholders of regionalisation, this article has 
explored the regionalisation preferences among Norwegian regional bureaucrats 
in context of the 2015-2020 Norwegian Regional Government Reform.  
A continuous strand in the public administration literature is to understand 
and explain the behaviour and preferences of bureaucrats (Egeberg & Stigen, 
2018). Contributing to this literature, the aim of this article has been to explore 
the drivers of regional bureaucrats’ regionalisation preferences, addressing how 
various dynamics affect them based on a combination of decentralisation theory 
and public administration literature.  
A historic alteration of the regional level, the Norwegian Regional 
Government Reform amalgamated counties and transferred a set of functions to 
the regional governments. To examine the regional bureaucrats’ attitudes 
towards this process, an original survey captured and measured a range of 
observables related to their desires for increasing the scope of regional 
responsibilities.  
Generally, the bureaucrats do not display a great eagerness to regionalise 
competences. Instead, the pre-reform arrangement of competence placement 
seems most desirable. Where the bureaucrats desire more functions to the 
regional level, they are primarily driven by governance principles and 
community logics, less so by arguments relating to functional effects and 
pressures.  
For the bureaucrats to support widening responsibilities at the regional level, 
their desire to increase the level of regional autonomy matters most, being 
consistently and positively related with the allocation of competences to the 
regional level. 
This explanatory factor serves as a more independent dynamic than the 
theoretical foundations for it would suggest. Although the bureaucrats feel it is 
important to improve the quality of the services they provide, it does not 
influence their desires to regionalise more responsibilities to the regional 
governments. This is somewhat surprising, as the notions of increased autonomy 
and improved services are theoretically linked. Testing this linkage empirically, 
however, shows that the effect of the “improved services” argument remains 
insignificant across all levels of desires for increased autonomy. This indicates a 
more principled approach rather than a functional line of thinking among the 
bureaucrats than is assumed in both decentralisation theory and broader public 
administration literature.  
It is, however, supported by the second most prevalent finding. Playing into 
the same dynamics as a desire to increase regional autonomy, the bureaucrats’ 
feeling of regional attachment also increases support for regionalising 
competences, though to a somewhat lesser extent. Taken together, we therefore 
see a strong explanation for regional administrative decentralisation preferences 
from principles and valued norms held by the bureaucrats.  
Functional explanations for desiring competence regionalisation are more 







administrations sometimes, though to a lesser extent, support regionalising 
competences within certain policy areas, but also represent the only case of a 
negative effect.  
This is not to say that these types of explanations don’t matter. Higher 
ranked and more senior bureaucrats can be expected to have some knowledge of 
which competences could – or should – be transferred to the regional level. We 
do not fully know, however, whether these explanatories capture the desire for 
increased responsibilities due to purely functional necessity or professional self-
interest, though empirical observations through open-ended responses suggest 
the former. However, these responses do not vary distinctly from their lower 
ranked colleagues; as such the validity of assuming that a purely functional and 
not personal motivation-based argument lies behind these explanatories may be 
debatable, as a widened managerial portfolio also may invoke a feeling of 
increased personal status within the new regional administrations.  
Having explored various drivers of decentralisation preferences among 
regional bureaucrats, the findings in this article have shed light on a “principle-
functional” dynamic, showing how, when faced with decentralisation measures, 
regional bureaucrats are driven by the former to a larger extent than the latter. 
This finding challenges some notions of bureaucratic functional thinking, and 
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics of control variables 
Variable N Mean SD Min Median Max 
Gender 1239 0.49 0.50 0 0 1 
Age 1239 48.88 10.21 22 49 69 
Left-Right Ideological 
Self-Placement 1149 2.49 1.30 1 2 5 
Education: Level 1239 4.65 0.77 1 5 6 
Education: Oslo 1239 1.45 0.73 1 1 3 
Education: Law 1239 0.06 0.24 0 0 1 
Education: Economy 1239 0.26 0.44 0 0 1 
Education: Social Sciences 1239 0.30 0.46 0 0 1 
Education: Humanities 1239 0.23 0.42 0 0 1 
Education: Natural 
Sciences 1239 0.16 0.37 0 0 1 
Job Experience Outside 
Public Sector 1238 0.71 0.46 0 1 1 
Has Worked: Central State 1239 0.18 0.38 0 0 1 
Has Worked: Regional 
State 1239 0.20 0.40 0 0 1 
Has Worked: Local State 1239 0.05 0.23 0 0 1 
Previous Employment in 
Local Government 1239 0.42 0.49 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Planning 1239 0.11 0.31 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Economy 1239 0.12 0.33 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Legal Service 1239 0.03 0.16 0 0 1 
Current Employment: IT 1239 0.06 0.25 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Culture 1239 0.17 0.38 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Enterprise/Industry 1239 0.10 0.30 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Regional Development 1239 0.20 0.40 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Education 1239 0.16 0.36 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Traffic 1239 0.06 0.24 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Environment 1239 0.07 0.25 0 0 1 
Stance: Forced 
Amalgamations 1211 2.46 1.37 1 2 5 
Stance: Voluntary 
Amalgamations 1218 3.80 1.17 1 4 5 
Population 1239 293,549.63 1.61e+05 76,149 247,084 604,368 
GDP per Capita 1239 398.48 57.81 311 396 528 
County Status: 


























































Correlation matrix of central independent variables. Correlation coefficients with significance levels 
in brackets. 
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* p<0.05 , ** 
p<0.01 , *** 
p<0.001  
               
OLS-regression tables of figure 2 in paper. R = Rudimentary model; C = Controls model. Linear regression models of all nine policy 
areas. Non-significant effects omitted; t statistics in parentheses. 
LR Ideology: Left-Right Ideological Self-Placement; Edu: SS = Education: Social Sciences; Edu: Hum = Education: Humanities; Emp. 
Plan = Current Employment: Planning; Emp. Culture = Current Employment: Culture; Emp. Reg Dev = Current Employment: 
Regional Development; Emp. Edu = Current Employment: Education; Emp: Traffic = Current Employment: Traffic; Emp. Env = 
Current Employment: Environment; Prev. Emp: Local Gov = Previous Employment in Local Government 
 
Sector Dimensionality 
The policy areas were chosen based on their prevalence in the reform. We 
should theoretically expect them to correlate to a certain extent, as they all relate 
to policy regionalisation. As table A3 shows, this is indeed the case. To explore 
this, an analysis of the central independent variables was rerun with a simple 








Table A5. Regression analysis of central explanatory and control variables on 
regionalisation index dependent variable 
Variable Rudimentary Controls 
Increasing Autonomy 0.29*** 0.28*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) 
Improving Services 0.08* 0.08* 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Seniority 0.06*  
 (0.03)  
Rank 0.16*** 0.164*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Attachment 0.06*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Left-Right Ideological Self-Placement -0.07*** 
  (0.02) 
Edu: SS 0.19*** 
  (0.07) 
Has Worked: Central State -0.14* 
  (0.08) 
Prev. Emp.: Local Gov. -0.13** 
  (0.06) 
Emp. LS 0.33* 
  (0.20) 
Emp. Culture -0.15* 
  (0.09) 
Emp. Reg. Dev. 0.14* 
  (0.08) 
Emp. Edu -0.36*** 
  (0.08) 
Emp. Traffic -0.20* 
  (0.12) 
Stance: Voluntary Amalgamations 0.046* 
  (0.03) 
County Status: Centre/Periphery -0.19** 
  (0.08) 
Constant 1.739*** 1.67*** 
 (0.19) (0.43) 
N 1,239 1,114 
R-squared 0.14 0.21 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
OLS-regression tables of independent variables effects on regionalisation index based on the nine 
policy area variables. Non-significant effects omitted; standard error in parenteses. 
Edu: SS = Education: Social Sciences; Emp. LS = Current Employment: Legal Service; Emp. 
Culture = Current Employment: Culture; Emp. Reg. Dev. = Current Employment: Regional 
Development; Emp. Edu = Current Employment: Education; Emp. Traffic = Current Employment: 
Traffic; Prev. Emp.: Local Gov. = Previous Employment in Local Government. 
 
Overall, the effects do not significantly alter the paper’s conclusions. A desire 
for increased autonomy still strongly affects their regionalisation preferences, 
while rank and attachment also do so, though to lesser extents. 
In addition to a simple additive index analysis, a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test 
was run to determine whether the policy areas could be broken into 
distinguishable underlying categories. Returning a value of 0.84, this test 







Table A6. Explorative factor analysis of the nine policy areas (2-factor solution) 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Regional Planning 0.7602  
Agriculture  0.5260 
Immigrant Integration  0.8198 
Cultural Grants 0.6839  
Cultural Institutions 0.5803  
Roads and Transport 0.6582  
Climate and Environment 0.4692  
Secondary Education 0.6538  
Community Development 0.6502  
Variance explained (%) 34 16 
Cronbach’s α 0.77 0.32 
Notes: Factor analysis, 2 factors with eigenvalues over 1. 
Analysis run specifying 2 factors after initial explorative 
analysis. Factor loadings > 0.4 omitted. 
Factor correlation Factor 1 Factor 2 
Factor 1 0.9422 0.3351 
Factor 2 -0.3351 0.9422 
 
The principal factor analysis returned nine components, with the two first 
displaying eigenvalues > 1 (3,3 and 1,2, respectively). They accounted for 
cumulatively 50% of the variance (37% and 14% respectively). Hence, a two-
factor solution was chosen. 
Although omitting factor loadings below 0.4, the initial two-factor solution 
returned some overlap between the two factors. This was the case in agriculture 
(0.41 and 0.53 loadings in factors 1 and 2, respectively), and Climate and 
Environment (0.47 and 0.44 in factors 1 and 2, respectively). To “clean” the 
factors, the lowest values of the two were omitted. Factor 1 thus retains seven of 
the policy areas, while factor 2 only consists of two.  
Testing the internal consistency of the two factors reveals low levels of 
reliability, with Cronbach’s alpha values of 0.77 and 0.32, suggesting the factors 
are somewhat heterogeneous. Theoretically, the nine policy areas could be 
viewed as pertaining to national or regional/local matters. The heterogeneous 
nature of the two factors weakens this suspicion, however, and no further 





1 See Lie (2006) and Blindheim (2013) for regional political preferences towards future 
county structures and competences. Moreover, research projects ongoing (as of 2020) are 
collecting data on politicians’ and citizens’ views on the reform, while non-academic 
documentation refers to a large body of media coverage and public debates relating to the 
reform.  
2 In the 1970s, a nation-wide reform established directly elected regional representatives 
and their administrations, though did not specify the functions they would receive. The 





regional level's portfolio was since periodically debated, and while some minor reforms 
have taken place, large-scale territorial reforms prior to 2020 failed to materialise (Blom-
Hansen, Christiansen, Fimreite, & Selle, 2012; Flo, 2004; Selstad, 2003).  
3 While some counties expressed a desire to ‘retake’ the hospitals in the reform, this never 
became a realistic part of the political discussion. 
4 See government-appointed committee’s report “Decentralization of tasks from the state 
to the counties” (2018, p. 23) for a more detailed summary. 
5 Supporters of the reform frequently made use of these arguments in various discourses 
and debates. Additionally, the 2013-2017 Liberal and Christian Democratic parties’ 
manifestos make arguments pertaining to increased autonomy and improved services. 
When the two parties entered government in 2018 and 2019 respectively, these same 
arguments were also included in the expanded government declarations.  
6 See Bourdieu (1996) for a detailed discussion of how cultural and economic hierarchy 
systems affect group dynamics within the habitus (or social space).  
7 Oslo is classified as both a municipality and a county. Hence, there is no separate 
regional administration, as local government institutions also undertake county 
responsibilities.  
8 A method mirroring the design of Tatham and Bauer (2016).  
9 Although the overall debate during the reform’s process provided some of the policy 
selection, the primary source was the county government’s letters to the central 
government which outlined the policies and responsibilities they desired, sourced from 
the counties’ websites. 
10Although secondary education was an existing and important area of responsibility for 
the counties pre-reform, several of the tasks transferred in the reform have to do with 
"competence" – that is, tasks relating to adult training, education for immigrants, job 
training programs etc., falling within the secondary education area.  
 
